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OKLAHOMA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 51 WINTER, 1998 NUMBER 4
UNITED STATES V. MCVEIGH:
DEFENDING THE "MOST
HATED MAN IN AMERICA"
STEPHEN JONES* & JENNIFER GIDEON**
I. Introduction
Windows shattered, buildings collapsed, and the lives of Americans were changed
forever on April 19, 1995, at approximately 9:02 a.m., when an explosion destroyed
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.' At least 168
men, women, and children were killed by the blast that injured over 500 others.
Some eighty minutes after the blast, outside of Perry, Oklahoma, state authorities
arrested Timothy James McVeigh for weipons and traffic violations.' McVeigh was
held on suspicion of his involvement with the bombing, and within days, a criminal
complaint was issued alleging McVeigh's violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(f), which
* Stephen Jones, chief counsel for Timothy James McVeigh, practices law in Enid, Oklahoma. He
received his undergraduate education from the University of Texas and his LL.B. degree from the
University of Oklahoma in 1966. At the time of his appointment, Jones was special counsel to Governor
Frank Keating and also was engaged in private practice.
** Jennifer Gideon is an attorney practicing law in Oklahoma. She graduated with a B.A. in
sociology from the University of Oklahoma in 1995 and a J.D. with distinction from the University of
Oklahoma in 1998.
1. See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 349 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that the explosion caused over
$1,000,000 worth of damage and shattered over 100 windows). For a detailed description of the damage
caused by the blast, see City of Oklahoma City Document Management Team, Final Report, Alfred P.
Murrah Building Bombing April 19, 1995 (Apr. 16, 1996) (obtained by writing to Fire Protection
Publications, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma 74078-8045).
2. See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 349. The number is at least 168 because in addition to the identified 168,
there was an unidentified left leg found in the debris caused by the bomb. See Jo Thomas, McVeigh
Defense Team Suggests Real Bomber Was Killed in Blast, N.Y. TIMEs, May 23, 1997, at Al. The
McVeigh defense team advanced the theory at trial that the unidentified left leg belonged to the bomber.
See id.
3. See In re Material Witness Warrant Terry Lynn Nichols, 77 F.3d 1277, 1278 (10th Cir. 1996)
(finding appeal of material witness warrant moot upon filing of new arrest warrant).
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makes it a crime "to maliciously damage or destroy by means of an explosive any
building or real property, in whole or in part owned, possessed' or used by the
United States, or any agency or department thereof."'
The trial that followed McVeigh's arrest involved issues never before presented
to the courts of the United States.5 Each of these issues carries legal significance.
Although some of the decisions were made in favor of the prosecution and some in
favor of the defense, all carry import. While we all hope there is not another crime
of this magnitude committed on American soil, there is much to be learned from an
evaluation of what it took to convict those thought to be guilty of committing it.
This article traces the matters involved and the decisions made in the McVeigh trial
from the initial charging complaint to my withdrawal as counsel after the verdict
and sentencing phase.6
IL Setting Forth the Complaint
As stated in the introduction, the initial charging complaint alleged a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 844(f). The information relied upon in the complaint stemmed from
composite drawings of individuals thought to be involved in the bombing.7 A
former co-worker of McVeigh identified him as one of the individuals in the
composites that were shown on television.' At that time, authorities learned that
McVeigh was being held in Perry, Oklahoma, in relation to firearm and traffic
violations, and issued the complaint."
After the State dismissed its charges, McVeigh was transferred, in front of a mob
of people booing ard shouting "murderer" and "baby killer" at him, from the Noble
County Jail to Tinker Air Force Base." McVeigh was forced to wear a protective
4. Criminal Complaint at 1, United States v. MeVeigh, Case No. M-95-98-H (Apr. 21, 1995).
5. See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 352 (mandating recusal of Federal Western District Judge Wayne E.
Alley and stating that "there is no case with similar facts to which we can look for guidance in our
application of the law to the facts in this case").
6. Although this article is co-authored, any use of first-person singular herein refers to Stephen
Jones.
7. See Criminal Complaint at 5, McVeigh (Case No. M-95-98-H).
8. See id.
9. See id. Within two hours of the bombing, McVeigh had been arrested by Oklahoma State
Trooper Charles Hanger north of Oklahoma City, one mile south of the Billings, Oklahoma exit on
Interstate 35. McVeigh was charged with a series of misdemeanor offenses that included carrying a
concealed weapon, not having proper insurance verification, and not having license tags. On April 21,
he was being held in the Noble County Jail because no bail had been set when the FBI located him and
subsequently arrested him on the federal complaint. The state charges were dismissed that same day.
Royce Hobbs, a Perry, Oklahoma attorney, attempted to see MeVeigh after he had been called several
times, but either jail officials or the FBI prevented Hobbs from seeing McVeigh. Hobbs then filed a
formal motion with th, Noble County District Court demanding access, which the Associate District
Judge granted. Hobbs' actions were in the highest tradition of the Bar. See In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467
(D. Md. 1934). He simply refused to be put off or blocked from seeing someone in custody who wished
to consult with an attorney. Petition for Access to Prisoner MeVeigh (on file with author).
10. See Bomb Suspect Charged; Man Upset by '93 Raid Near Waco, DAILY OKLAHOMAN
(Oklahoma City), Apr. 22, 1995, at 1.
[Vol. 51:617
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol51/iss4/2
1998] DEFENDING THE "MOST HATED MAN IN AMERICA" 619
vest and shield for fear that someone would injure him as he was being
transferred."
McVeigh made his initial appearance regarding the federal complaint at Tinker
Air Force Base on April 21, 1995. At that time, Susan Otto from the Federal Public
Defender's office was appointed to represent McVeigh. Otto successfully petitioned,
in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3005, to have John Coyle, an Oklahoma City
lawyer, appointed as co-counsel.
III. Withdrawal of Appointed Counsel Due to Conflicts of Interests
On Monday, April 24, 1995, both Otto and Coyle sought leave to withdraw as
court-appointed counsel for McVeigh. 2 Coyle argued in his Motion that he was
in downtown Oklahoma City on the day of the bombing and personally witnessed
the scene immediately following the blast. His law partner had been both
physically and psychologically damaged by the blast, and all of his employees were
upset by the subsequent evacuation. 4 Coyle lost several friends in the bombing."
Coyle argued that the personal effect of the bomb rendered the possible appearance
of impropriety on his involvement as counsel for the defendant. 6 He further
argued that no lawyer from Oklahoma City should represent McVeigh because the
accused deserves fair, impartial, and objective consideration. 7
Otto urged that she be allowed to withdraw not only because of the personal
effect the bombing had on her, but because of the right afforded to McVeigh to
have a fair trial with the impartial assistance of an attorney. 8 The explosion
substantially damaged Otto's offices. 9 Her staff had to evacuate the area and knew
individuals who died as a result of the bomb." The close proximity of the Federal
Public Defender's office to the bombing site impacted the ability of anyone from
that office to represent the accused.2'
U.S. Magistrate Ronald L. Howland denied both motions without prejudice on
April 26, 1995. Howland cited his confidence in the ability of appointed counsel
11. See id.
12. See Motion to Withdraw and for Appointment of Substitute Counsel, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H);
Application for Appointment of Substitute Counsel and Concomitant Motion to Withdraw, McVeigh (No.
M-95-98-H).
13. See Application for Appointment of Substitute Counsel and Concomitant Motion to Withdraw,
McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See Motion to Withdraw and for Appointment of Substitute Counsel at 2, McVeigh (No. M-95-
98-H).
18. See Application for Appointment of Substitute Counsel and Concomitant Motion to Withdraw
at 2, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See d.
22. See Order Entered April 26, 1995, at 5, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
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to remain professionalY However, at the preliminary hearing on April 27, 1995,
both Otto and Coyle renewed their requests for withdrawal.' Howland stated that
the motions were temporarily denied and that the court was conducting a search to
find possible alternative counsel, should that be necessary.2
On May 8, 1995, both Otto and Coyle filed petitions renewing their motions to
withdraw as court-appointed counsel.' On the evening of May 5, 1995, I was
contacted by Chief Judge Russell on behalf of the United States District Court and
asked whether, if requested, I would agree to defend an individual "who has been,
or would be, charged in the Oklahoma City bombing." The next day, I agreed to
represent Timothy James McVeigh. Chief District Court Judge David L. Russell
granted Otto's and Coyle's motions, and I was appointed as lead counsel in
accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act."
With this appointment, I had a clear appreciation of my responsibility and of that
"individual sense of duty which should . ..accompany the appointment of a
selected member o- the bar ... to defend" such a case as this." In accepting, I
recognized that in my position as McVeigh's defense counsel, it would be
impossible to satisfy everyone. I ultimately decided that I could satisfy only my
professional conscience.
I was to try and defend McVeigh in the face of an overwhelming public
condemnation - a demonization of McVeigh in which the presumption of
innocence was replaced by the assumption of guilt. I was to defend McVeigh in a
community in which literally thousands of lives had been adversely affected, indeed
ruined, by the act with which my client was charged.
I also recognized that no matter how severe the public criticism might be, how
damning of me, I had to subordinate my self interest to that which was best for
McVeigh. Regardless of how severe the public criticism might be,29 I could never
23. See id.
24. See Preliminary Hearing Transcript, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
25. See id
26. See Renewed Motion to Withdraw and for Appointment of Substitute Counsel, McVeigh (No.
M-95-98-H); Brief in Support of Motion Renewing Application for Appointment of Substitute Counsel
and Concomitant Motion to Withdraw, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
27. See Order Entered May 8, 1995, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H). The Criminal Justice Act is
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3005, 3006A.
28. Powell v. Alabrma, 287 U.S. 45, 56 (1932).
29. See, e.g., Editorial, One More for the Lawyers, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), Dec. 5,
1995, at 4, reprinted in Transcript, Dec. 13, 1995, at 19-21 (calling defense lawyer's change of venue
motions "[b]ogus," "[s]ttpid," "[a] waste of time," and "[aln insult to law-abiding Oklahomans"). Judge
Matsch obviously disagreed. Indeed, Patrick McGuigan's editorials were prime examples of defense
exhibits used to support the change of venue. For other critical comments, see Mark Eddy, Phony
Confession Broke Ethics Rule, DENVER POST, Mar. 10, 1997, at A l; Stephen Jones' Tangled Web, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEws (Denver), Mar. 5, 1997, at 36A (editorial following Dallas Morning News article
controversy). But see Lois Romano & Tom Kenworthy, Bomb 'Confession' Hoax Assertion Gains
Backing: Document May Have Been Part of Witness Ploy. WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1997, at A10; Karen
Abbot, Going All Out to Save McVeigh, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws (Denver), Mar. 9, 1997, at 5A; David
R. Dow, Dallas News'Action Mocks First Amendment, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 5, 1997, at 23; Why We
Should Salute Work of Stephen Jones, ATLANTA J., Apr. 8, 1997. The "Dallas Morning News
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fully explain why I had or had not done a certain thing, because professional honor
dictated that I could never tell anyone all that I knew. I was grateful for Judge
Matsch's written Order of March 17, 1997, which said in relevant part:
The Supreme Court has recognized that in circumstances such as
those surrounding this case, the function of defense counsel includes
representation "in the court of public opinion."
There can be no doubt about the foundational fairness provided for
the defendant in this case. He has lead counsel who has consistently
demonstrated his skill and experience as an advocate with a complete
and dedicated commitment to his professional responsibility in the
representation of Timothy McVeigh. Mr. Jones has the assistance of
other capable and responsible lawyers, selected by him for particular
assignments."
At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Matsch said, addressing me, "I think that you
and the other lawyers on your team in the courtroom conducted the defense of
Timothy McVeigh with honor and dignity and with a due regard for your role as
officers of the Court.
3'
As McVeigh's principal defense attorney, I was charged with the responsibility
of presenting his defense. He was described often as "the most hated man in
America." My job was to do and say for him what he could not do and say for
himself, and to see that neither his life nor his liberty was taken from him except
in accordance with due process of law. 2 I told Judge Russell when I accepted the
appointment that I would not defend McVeigh with one hand tied behind my back,
and that I viewed my role as his defense counsel as one requiring me to be zealous
in his defense.3
controversy" stemmed from an article printed by the newspaper that alleged McVeigh had confessed to
bombing the Murrah Building. The article was alleged to have quite an effect on the jury, resulting in
prejudice to the defendant. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1180 (10th Cir. 1998). Once
the Dallas Morning News story appeared, MeVeigh's defense was beyond redemption by even the most
skilled of our craft.
30. Order Dated Mar. 17, 1997, Document No. 3429, United States v. McVeigh, 955 F. Supp 1281,
1282 (D. Colo. 1997) (No. 3429) (citations omitted).
31. Transcript at 15, United States v. McVeigh, Case No. 96-CR-68-M (June 13, 1997).
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 1.3 (1996).
33. Rule 1.3 substitutes "reasonable diligence and promptness" for "zeal." Id.; see also MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1969) (stating that a lawyer should "represent a client
zealously within the bounds of law"). I believe that a criminal defense lawyer is required to be zealous
on a client's behalf. But see State v. Richardson, 514 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); see also
HOWARD SACKS, DEFENDING THE UNPOPULAR CLIENT (Nat'l Council on Legal Clinics, Chicago 1961);
WILLIAM KUNSTLER, THE CASE FOR COURAGE (1962); Leon Jaworski, The Unpopular Cause, 47 A.B.A.
J. 714 (1961). The American Trial Lawyers Association Code Rule 2.1 provides that "in a matter
entrusted to a lawyer by a client, the lawyer shall give undivided fidelity to the client's interest as
perceived by the client, unaffected by any interest of the lawyer or of any other person, or by the
lawyer's perception of the public interest." AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION CODE Rule 2.1
(1991), reprinted in JOHN BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS, LAW, AND LIABILITY C-3 (1986). Rule
3.1 provides that "a lawyer shall use all legal means that are consistent with the retainer agreement, and
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
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There are many reasons for my acceptance of McVeigh's defense. He needed a
lawyer and I thought it was important that he be defended by an Oklahoma trial
lawyer. I took the case because, as I viewed my oath of obligation as a lawyer, I
had a duty to accept.' Once I accepted, it was my duty to see that the legal system
established by our Constitution worked and that nothing was taken from McVeigh
except in accordance with the due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution.
My representation of McVeigh was made easier by the personal support from my
family and my friends in Enid, and by the wonderful staff we assembled. These
individuals did not share the public focus with me, but each was in his or her own
way a part of the zealous defense of Tim McVeigh.
IV. Criminal Justice Act
A. The Origin of the Act
The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, provides that:
Each United States district court, with the approval of the judicial
council of the circuit, shall place in operation throughout the district a
plan for furnishing representation for any person financially unable to
obtain adequate representation in accordance with this section.
Representation under each plan shall include counsel and investigative,
expert, and other services necessary for adequate representation."
House Report 874 states:
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 required the Federal judiciary to
provide for the legal representation of eligible Federal criminal defen-
dants who were financially unable to afford their own attorneys. In
response, the Federal judiciary created the Federal Defender Services
program. This program provides legal services for eligible defendants
through a mixed system, which includes 45 Federal Public Defender
Organizations (FPF's), 10 Community Defender Organizations (CDO's),
private "panel" attorneys chosen from a list or maintained by the district
courts. 6
B. The Result of the Act's Application
The number of defendants requiring assistance in federal cases has risen each
year. In hearings to determine the amount each agency should receive under the
1999 fiscal year Appropriations Act, the Senate noted that the number of defendants
reasonably available, to advance a client's interests as the client perceives them." Id. Rule 3.1, available
in BURKOFF, supra, at C-4.
34. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2(c) (1996); see
also ABA CODE, EC 2-28, 2-29 (1969); Peter Applebome, The Pariah as Client: Bombing Case
Rekindles Debate for Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at Al.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. IV 1998).
36. H.R. REP. No. 104-874, at 1481 (1997).
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who receive appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act "has risen from 82
percent in fiscal year 1996 to an estimated 93 percent in the fiscal year 1999 ap-
propriation."37
Another issue concerning a defendant using public funds to aid in his defense is
whether the records of the cost of his defense should be open to the public.
Recognizing the conflict inherent in this determination, Judge Matsch stated:
The attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine protect some
information from opposing counsel....
A defendant unable to pay for his defense is in very different cir-
cumstances. He must rely on the court's authority under the Criminal
Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, for payment for counsel, investigators,
experts and any other services necessary for adequate representation
pursuant to plans approved by the judicial council of each circuit under
the supervision of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts within guidelines promulgated by the Judicial
Conference of the United States.
38
These documents may be placed under seal by petition to the court or on the court's
own motion. 9
Judge Matsch held that the privacy owed McVeigh outweighed any interests that
the public might have in learning of the cost of the defense prior to the conclusion
of the proceedings.' He stated "[a]ccordingly, this court finds and concludes that
the request for the amounts of expenditures made for defense services before trial
must be denied for the protection of the interests identified in this opinion.""'
C. Defense Costs
Newspaper and magazine reports indicate that the defense of McVeigh cost
somewhere between $10 and $15 million. I do not know the precise figure because
some of the accounting went directly to the court, but I suspect that the figure is
fairly accurate. The Department of Justice said in a public press statement that the
cost of the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of the two defendants cost the
government approximately $82.6 million.
Judges Russell and Alley were generally consistent in their support of our
applications for defense authorization, but Judge Matsch was fully committed to an
adequate funding for the defense, and did not "second guess" defense counsel's
strategy. In some instances, he informed me that he doubted the admissibility of
some evidence we sought to develop but allowed us the funds to develop it. He
stated that funding for investigation and the defense and admissibility of evidence
developed from those investigative efforts involve two different standards.
37. H.R. REP. No. 105-636, at 224 (1998).
38. United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1452, 1459, 1460 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 1460.
41. Id. at 1466.
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Although some who were unfamiliar with the facts in the case criticized defense
travel overseas, Judge Matsch fully authorized the trips to find expert witnesses,
interview fact witnesses, or pursue investigative leads. Defense counsel submitted
detailed statements to justify all expenditures. All costs in excess of $300 had to
be approved in advance by a judge, though there were certain standing orders and
authorizations for travel expenses. Some of those standing orders involved travel
between Oklahoma City and Denver, equipment rental, and leases for apartment and
office space. Each month vouchers were submitted to the court by counsel, expert
witnesses, and thhd party vendors. I would estimate that approximately 99% or
more of the defense authorizations were approved by the court.
These requested authorizations were made by written motion unless permission
and authorization were sought on an emergency basis. On a rare occasion, we felt
comfortable incurring the expenses in advance if necessity demanded, and the court
always approved the expenditure afterwards.42 Defense counsel were generally paid
within thirty (30) (lays after the vouchers were submitted, though there were some
frustrations in 1995 with being paid promptly and timely because of the
"government shutdown" and the unique features of defending so massive a case. I
signed a personal note for a substantial line of credit to tide the defense over until
the payment from the government became more dependable.
The defense expenditures were appropriate and necessary. As Chief Judge Matsch
himself wrote on March 17, 1997:
A fair trial has its origin in foundational fairness provided by legal rules
governing the investigation, arrest and preparation of charges. Foun-
dational fairness requires that the person accused has legal counsel with
the skill, competence, experience and courage to provide him with
effective representation of his interests at all stages of the proceedings.
When counsel are appointed, they must be given adequate resources to
support a separate and independent investigation, including technological
tools and the expertise of those who have relevant knowledge and
experience to assist in preparing to challenge the charges made against
the defendant.43
42. One such occa;ion was a trip to Israel by two defense team members to locate an expert witness
and to interview members of the Israeli National Police. The invitation for the trip came with almost no
advance notice while members of the team were in the United Kingdom interviewing witnesses. The
tickets were purchased with cash, and the team members arrived at Heathrow Airport within minutes of
the scheduled departure of the El Al 747. Because of these circumstances, plus the contents of counsel's
briefcase (material and text concerning explosive trace analysis), Israeli security conducted a thorough
examination of the luggage and the defense team members were closely questioned while the departure
of the plane was delayed. Eventually, they were allowed to board. Lead counsel and occasionally others
carried certain papers, the exact description of which should not be disclosed, which facilitated
transportation and VISA arrangements in unusual circumstances such as these.
43. Order and Memorandum Opinion Denying Motion to Dismiss or In the Alternative, Request for
Abatement or Other Relief Entered March 17, 1997, United States v. McVeigh, 955 F. Supp 1281, 1282
(D. Colo. 1997) (No. 3429).
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There were substantial, indeed compelling, reasons for such extraordinary
expenses. For one, the crime was unprecedented. The bombing of the Murrah
Building was the largest act of domestic terrorism and revolutionary terror in the
United States. It was, not to put too fine a point on it, the largest mass murder in
American history. McVeigh's defense lawyers had to examine 168 files of the State
Medical Examiner's Office and all other files concerning human remains. We
reviewed more than 30,000 interviews of witnesses taken by the FBI and other
government agencies. More than 100,000 photographs were provided by the
government and examined by the defense. We reviewed records of 156 million
telephone calls and over one million hotel and motel registrations, together with
over 500 hours of audio tape and over 400 hours of video tape. About 25,000 pages
of lab reports and worksheets were provided for the defense after their production
was ordered by the court.
As McVeigh's counsel, we had to defend against perhaps one hundred ancillary
actions filed in the case by victims, organizations claiming to speak for victims, the
collective media, individual media organizations, interlopers, and strangers to the
case. In addition, we filed a number of motions that were vigorously contested by
the government. Almost none of these issues was conceded by the government.
Because of the inordinate cost of the defense, we undertook various initiatives to
hold down the cost to the taxpayers. Each of the senior lawyers on the team in the
defense headquarters in Denver voluntarily paid a certain percentage of his or her
billings into a common fund. These collective funds helped to pay law students and
to provide additional office space, newspaper subscriptions, and other matters not
paid for by the court. Judge Matsch was very considerate of the defense and
arranged for housing of the defense lawyers at the Denver Place Apartments, located
a block from the courthouse. We delayed our departure from Oklahoma to Denver
until late December 1996. The government and Mike Tigar, on behalf of Terry
Nichols, moved to Denver eight months ahead of us. By remaining longer in
Oklahoma, we saved probably $100,000 a month in defense costs. Our view was
that the crime was in Oklahoma and many of the most important witnesses were in
Oklahoma and Kansas. We felt there was simply no reason to move to Denver until
it became absolutely necessary.
V. The Indictment
A. Allowing the Government More Time
On June 12, 1995, Judge Russell granted the government extra time within which
to file an indictment against McVeigh. We objected for several reasons. First, we
argued that the government had not cooperated with McVeigh concerning discovery
of the information uncovered during the grand jury proceedings." Second, despite
there being no conviction and indeed no formal charges, McVeigh was held in
punitive conditions where he was under twenty-four-hour video surveillance, where
he had no exercise facilities or access to a television or radio, and where he had
44. See Order Entered June 12, 1995, at 1-2, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
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limited opportunities for social interchange s Finally, continued delay would allow
the government additional time to abuse the grand jury discovery process."
The court ruled that it was not prejudicial to withhold information from the
defendant during the grand jury process, and any objections to discovery were
premature.47 The court did agree that the conditions of the defendant's detention
were inadequate and ruled that the government meet with defense counsel to remedy
some of the problems.4
In support of his holding allowing the government more time within which to
return an indictment, the Judge stated that the bombing was unprecedented and the
government had to sift through a large volume of evidentiary material.4" The nature
of the crime justified the continued delay in returning an indictment."
B. A True Bill
On August 10, 1995, the government filed the indictments against Timothy James
McVeigh, Terry :Lynn Nichols,5' and others unknown. The indictments charged
them with one count of conspiracy' to use a weapon of mass destruction, 18
U.S.C. § 2332a; one count of use of a weapon of mass destruction (a "truck
bomb"), 18 U.S.C. § 2332a; one count of destruction by explosives, 18 U.S.C. §
844(f); and eight counts of first degree murder, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1814 and 1111.5
Pleas of not guilty were entered by McVeigh and Nichols on August 15, 1995.
45. See id.
46. See i.d
47. See id. at 5.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Nichols and IvleVeigh were charged together and their case went forward as one case until the
court ordered that they be tried separately. Thus, while I discuss decisions with relevance to MeVeigh,
quite often challenges were brought by one party and then adopted by the other. The evidence with
respect to each defendant was substantially different. The resulting court decision, however, impacted
both parties.
52. The indictment identified 160 deceased. One hundred fifty-two were named in count 1, the
"conspiracy count," arid eight were named in counts 4 through 11. Six individuals, who allegedly died
outside the Murrah Building, were not named in the indictment because it was assumed that they would
be named in compara',le Oklahoma state criminal prosecutions, the exact contours of which were not
known.
53. The federal agents killed were Special Agent of the United States Secret Service Mickey Bryant
Maroney, Special Agent of the United States Secret Service Donald R. Leonard, Assistant Special Agent
in charge of the United States Secret Service Alan Gerald Whicher, Special Agent of the United States
Secret Service Cynthia Lynn Campbell-Brown, Special Agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration Kenneth Glenn McCullough, Special Agent of the United States Customs Service Paul
Douglass Ice, Special Agent of the United States Customs Service Claude Arthur Medearis, and Special
Agent of the Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Inspector General Paul G.
Broxterman.
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C. Challenges to the Indictment
Several challenges were raised by either McVeigh or Nichols and then adopted
by the other. Primary among those were challenges to the indictment based on
multiplicity, abatement, and violations of the Commerce Clause.' The constitu-
tionality of the indictment was ultimately upheld."
Multiplicity involves charging an individual with several counts for one single
offense, which violates double jeopardy provisions by subjecting the individual to
multiple punishments for one act. We argued that charging McVeigh with
multiple counts for the one act of detonating a single bomb violated McVeigh's
protection against double jeopardy. The court held that each offense has an element
that the other does not and that each intended target is an essential element of the
crime.' The court ruled that each murder count is a separate count because the
"killing of each of these eight victims is a separate 'unit of prosecution."'
58
The doctrine of abatement provides that by amending a statute, Congress
expressly or impliedly repeals the statute for which prosecution is pending 9 After
McVeigh's indictment was issued, Congress amended §2332a(a)(2) by enacting §725
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 so that, with regard
to weapons-crimes against persons, the result affects interstate commerce or threats
of such use would have affected interstate or foreign commerce, justifying federal
regulations.'
The court ruled that abatement did not apply with respect to McVeigh's case
because an intent to abate by Congress must be express.' Congress amended the
statute to make clear that in the future, jurisdiction is ensured when the prohibited
conduct affects or will affect interstate commerce.' The court held that such a
finding had been explicit with respect to McVeigh.'
With respect to the Commerce Clause of Article I of the United States
Constitution, to enact laws that regulate activity affecting interstate commerce,
Congress must make a finding that the regulated activity's effect is substantial.'
The finding need not be explicit if it is discernible from the statutory language and
if there is a rational basis for believing it affects interstate commerce.'
54. See United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1571, 1574-75 (10th Cir. 1996).
55. See id. at 1578.
56. See MeVeigh's Motion to Dismiss Counts Five Through Eleven and/or to Consolidate Counts
Four Through Eleven and Brief in Support at 2, Sept. 29, 1995, United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp.
1571 (10th Cir. 1996) (No. CR-95-110-A).
57. See McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. at 1583.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 1578.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 1576.
65. See id.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
We based our argument on United States v. Lopez.' In Lopez, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated the Gun Free Schools Act on the basis that it exceeded
the power granted to regulate interstate commerce. Lopez contained no language in
the statute or the legislative history demonstrating any effect on interstate
commerce. As it k:?plied to McVeigh, the court held that the impact of a truck bomb
on interstate commerce is "both obvious and substantial."67 In contrast, the statute
involved in Lopez could, in no circumstances, be said to have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.'
However, the court held that the jury must make a specific finding that the effect
of the behavior in each particular case has a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.' The court stated that such a particularized finding ensures that application
of the statute is constitutional.
VI. Motion to Transfer
A. Initial Argument for Transfer
On April 24, 1995, in addition to filing their motions to withdraw as counsel,
Otto and Coyle filed a Motion to Transfer and Brief in support thereof.7 In
support of the Motion to Transfer to another state, counsel cited the fact that the
Federal District Courthouse for the Western District is located directly across the
street from the Murrah Building.' Not only did the courthouse sustain damage, but
several of the workers were injured as wellZ3 The effects of the bomb rendered the
federal judges percipient witnesses and, in their view, unable to render an unbiased
probable cause determination.'
Counsel argued that impartiality is also needed of those who will possibly be
chosen to sit on the grand jury to determine whether to issue an indictment against
McVeigh.' For this, defense counsel relied upon the media coverage following the
explosion, which included continuous coverage and the televising of the United
States President's attendance at a prayer service for the victims on Sunday, April 23,
1995, in Oklahoma City.76 Defense counsel cited Murphy v. Florida, which
stated that prejudice may be presumed where "the influence of the news media,
either in the community at large or in the courtroom itself, pervaded the
proceedings."
66. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
67. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. at 1576.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 1578;.
70. See id.
71. See Motion to Transfer, Apr. 24, 1995, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H); Brief in Support of Motion
to Transfer, Apr. 24, 1995, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
72. See Brief in Support of Motion to Transfer at 2, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
73. See id&
74. See id. at 4.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 11.
77. 421 U.S. 794, 798-99 (1975).
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The government argued that there was no precedent for transfer prior to there
being an indictment or information filed." The indictment would not result until
a grand jury proceeding returned a true bill after conducting an investigation.'
Also, while McVeigh may waive his rights to a grand jury determination in a
particular venue, he cannot waive the rights of others who may also be charged.'
Additionally, the government argued that merely because a judge was acquainted
with one or more of the victims did not mean that he or she could not preside in an
unbiased manner, and if a conflict did emerge, the proper action was to bring in a
judge from another district.' Magistrate Howland agreed and denied the motion
to transfer, citing the filing of an indictment or information as a prerequisite to such
a determination.'
B. Renewal of the Argument for Transfer
We renewed the argument for a transfer of venue in November of 1995.
Relying on Rule 21(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, we argued that
McVeigh deserved a fair trial by impartial jurors&" In support of our argument that
the media in Oklahoma was saturated with prejudicial pretrial publicity, we included
1087 pages from the Daily Oklahoman, 317 pages from the Lawton Constitution,
313 pages from the Tulsa World, and 926 pages of transcripts from local news
broadcasts.'
While the district court had named Lawton, Oklahoma, as the place for trial
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 116(c) and Local Court Rule 3(D), we argued that the pool
of individuals from which the jury would be selected was also subjected to the
media saturation and had already formed an opinion about McVeigh's guilt.' Thus,
we urged that another metropolitan city within the Tenth Circuit be chosen as the
place to hold the trial.' Chief Judge Matsch agreed.'
Matsch recognized that in most cases the effect of pre-trial publicity is
determined during jury selection; however, waiting for that determination would
only have caused undue delay.' Matsch was also concerned about the inability to
select a jury in Lawton because he believed that "a failed attempt to select a jury
would, itself, cause widespread public comment creating additional difficulty in
beginning again at another place."'
78. See Opposition to Motion to Transfer at 1, Apr. 26, 1995, McVeigh (No. M-98-95-H).
79. See id. at 2.
80. See id. at 3-4.
81. See id. at 4.
82. See Order Entered April 26, 1995, at 2, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
83. See Defendant McVeigh's Brief in Support of Motion for Change of Venue, Nov. 21, 1995,
United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467 (10th Cir. 1996) (No. CR-95-110-MH).
84. See id. at 4.
85. See id. at 5.
86. See id. at 47.
87. See id. at 46.
88. See United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (10th Cir. 1996).
89. See id. at 1470.
90. Id.
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Matsch noted the differences in the media coverage that occurred within the state
and that which occurred nationally, stating that Oklahoma's coverage was more
personal and contained stories of the effects on individuals' daily lives.9 He also
noted that the majority of Oklahomans expressed in an opinion poll that upon
finding McVeigh guilty, the only appropriate sentence would be a sentence of
death.' Matsch stated that such a belief deprived the defendant of individualized
sentencing as guaranteed by his due process rights. 3 For these reasons, Judge
Matsch appropriately transferred venue to Denver, Colorado.'
VII. Recusal
A. Requests by All Parties to the Litigation
Both McVeigh and Nichols moved, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 145, to
have all judges from the United States Western District Court of Oklahoma removed
from the case.95 The government agreed and urged the judges to recuse themselves
voluntarily to ensure that the nation have complete confidence in the verdict
rendered.' Judge Alley disagreed.' Relying on United States v. Harrelson,"
Judge Alley ruled that neither he nor any of the judges needed to recuse themsel-
ves. 99
B. Initial Denial of Requests for Recusal
Harrelson involved a judge who was not forced to recuse himself despite there
being a strong friendship between the deceased individual whom the defendants
were charged with killing and the fact that the courthouse in which the trial was
held was named after the deceased."' Judge Alley used this case to support his
ruling that he need not recuse himself from presiding over the case of United States
v. McVeigh.' Also, Judge Alley stated that he did not know personally of facts
that were in dispute, nor had any of the parties shown actual bias on his part."
Judge Alley cited United States v. Cooley"n as providing the test for deter-
mining the appearance of impartiality. The test is "whether a reasonable person,
knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's impar-
91. See id. at 1471.
92. See id. at 1474.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1475.
95. See Brief of th,, United States in Response to Defense Recusal Motions at 1 (Sept. 8, 1995),
United States v. McVeig4, 918 F. Supp. 1452 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (No. CR-95-1 10-A).
96. See id.
97. See Order Entered Sep. 14, 1995, at 16, McVeigh (No. CR-95-1 10-A).
98. 754 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985).
99. See Order Entered Sep. 14, 1995, at 16, McVeigh (No. CR-95-1 10-A).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993).
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tiality."'"4 Judge Alley did not believe that a reasonable person would harbor
doubts about his impartiality."n
C. Granting of Recusal Requests
Defendant Nichols filed a writ of mandamus to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals seeking the disqualification of Judge Alley.'" This writ was granted and
the court held that there was a reasonable basis to question Judge Alley's
impartiality." Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 requires recusal when the appearance of
impartiality exists." An analysis under this statute requires an evaluation of the
facts involved."' The court of appeals noted that there are no other cases with
facts similar to McVeigh."' Citing the fact that Judge Alley's courtroom was
damaged in the blast and was located less than one block from the blast's epicenter,
the court ruled that recusal was necessary."'
It is important to note that no actual impartiality by Judge Alley was shown. In
fact, the court noted, "[tihere is certainly no allegation here of judicial impropriety;
Judge Alley has conducted himself with true professionalism. Were the standard by
which we must judge this case a subjective one, we could end our discussion
here.""
2
VIII. Trial in the Court of Public Opinion
Every aspect of the case attracted the widespread interest of the media. There
was no "public affairs" spokesman for the defense other than myself. In fact, all
members of the defense team were specifically prohibited from speaking with the
press, except Rob Nigh, who dealt with the Tulsa media; my assistant, Ann Bradley;
and others on the team when I' specifically authorized contact. The purpose of these
tight restrictions was to minimize the possibility of information being released that
would injure our client or the defense, or violate the court's orders. These rules
were rigidly enforced. Indeed, a particular member of the defense team who
released one item of information without authorization was docked $2000 as an
internal penalty and another was fired for such behavior. Of course, the materials
released to The Dallas Morning News and to Playboy resulted in the dismissal of
the individuals involved. Yet, aside from these incidents, media relations were
reasonably cordial.
Our contacts with the media were completely consistent with our duties as
McVeigh's counsel, as Judge Matsch found. During the course of the trial he wrote:
104. Id. at 993.
105. See Order Entered Sep. 14, 1995, at 16, McVeigh (No. CR-95-110-A).
106. See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 350 (10th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
107. See id. at 352.
108. See id. at 351 (referring to when application of the statute is mandated).
109. See id. at 351.
110. See id. at 352.
111. See id.
112. Id.
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Counsel for the accused do not have an institutional structure for
investigation comparable to that of law enforcement agencies serving
the prosecution. . . Defense lawyers have a legitimate need to
communicate with the news media in preparing for trial. It is not
uncommon for lawyers on both sides of a criminal case to do a bit of
bartering in the information market."'
On June 13, 1996, in a published order, Judge Matsch stated this about our efforts
with respect to the press and the negative publicity:
Defense cunsel are understandably concerned that the pretrial
publicity may predispose public opinion to guilt of the defendants. Mr.
McVeigh's lawyers have been very sensitive to the possible effects of
those picture; of him and reports about him that they characterize as
condemnatory. Mr. Jones has been active in generating countervailing
publicity by granting interviews and making public statements about the
investigation that the McVeigh team has conducted, including leads to
other suspect,; and theories about possible perpetrators. Mr. Jones has
also helped Mr. McVeigh obtain personal publicity to dispel the
demonization effects of the early camera coverage of his arrest and
detention."
4
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Supreme Court of the United States, made the
following pertinent comment about the role of defense counsel in Gentile v. State
Bar of Nevada:
An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door. He or she
cannot ignore the practical implications of a legal proceeding for the
client. Just as an attorney may recommend a plea bargain or civil
settlement to avoid the adverse consequences of a possible loss after
trial, so too an attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a client's
reputation and reduce the adverse consequences of indictment, especial-
ly in the face of a prosecution deemed unjust or commenced with
improper motives. A defense attorney may pursue lawful strategies to
obtain dismissal of an indictment or reduction of charges, including an
attempt to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the client does
not deserve to be tried." 5
During the course of representing McVeigh, I dealt not only with representatives
of the four major networks, but also with media from all over the world."6 At the
113. United States v. McVeigh, 964 F. Supp 313, 315 (D. Colo. 1997).
114. United States v. McVeigh, 931 F. Supp. 756, 758 (D. Colo. 1996).
115. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991) (citation omitted).
116. These included Fox, MSNBC, BBC, French Television, Australian Television, Israeli State
Radio Network, Radio Colombia, Christian Broadcasting Company, Canadian Broadcasting Company,
and almost every major daily newspaper in this country from the New York Times, Boston Globe,
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Kansas City Star, Dallas Morning News, Tulsa World, Daily
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trial itself, more than 2500 reporters were accredited, and several hundred were
present at any one time.
The defense kept a record of the number of defense interviews requested. The
total number of requests exceeded 600, and the number granted over a two and a
half year period was less than 225, with many of those being very short statements
made on the street. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is reported to have said, "A
good catch word can escape analysis for 50 years"; so it is with the phrase "trying
the case in the press." Though many judges and some lawyers are critical of
lawyers who speak with the press about a case, the truth is that there is substantial
latitude in allowing lawyers to speak with the media under the applicable Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility,"' the American Bar Association's
Prosecutions and Defense Standards, and the Department of Justice guidelines.
Media contact was permissible, indeed necessary in our judgment, under the Model
Rules and Judge Matsch's orders. Judge Matsch himself recognized that represen-
tation of McVeigh included representation in the "Court of Public Opinion.".. The
velocity of coverage on the case, much of it based on false and misleading
information, required a defense "truth squad" to slow down a rush to judgment
before the first witness testified.
Generally, our office tried to follow the written guidelines of the Department of
Justice regarding media contact. When necessary or appropriate, I discussed with
the press the anticipated time frame or aspects of the defense preparation, issues
related to staffing and expenditures except for those sealed by the court, and the
basis of certain legal arguments over particular issues. I also discussed various
elements of the statute authorizing my appointment and the role of defense counsel
in particular.
During the course of the representation of McVeigh, the court's orders with
respect to what could and could not be discussed were modified four times."' To
the extent the matters were not under seal or covered by a prohibitory order, I
explained the legal positions the defendant was taking, particularly when those
issues became the subject of public debate. At no time was defense counsel
sanctioned, censured, reprimanded, or criticized by the court for any violation of
Oklahoman; to such other newspapers as the Buffalo News, the Phoenix Gazette, the Arkansas Gazette
Democrat and the McCurtain County Gazette. Additionally, the Sunday Times of London, the
Independent, the Observer, Manchester Guardian, Irish Times, (the French Daily) Liberation, Le Monde
Franlkfurt Allegmaine, and Reuters all presented inquiries, as did the National Law Journal, American
Lawyer, Legal Times, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report, New Yorker, Spin, George,
Economist, and the Enid Morning News and Eagle.
117. See an excellent article on the subject of media comment by attorneys written by the new
Oklahoma City University Law School Dean. Lawrence K. Hellman, The Oklahoma Supreme Court's
New Rules on Attorney Trial Publicity: Realism and Aspiration, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1998).
118. United States v. McVeigh, 955 F. Supp 1281, 1282 (D. Colo. 1997).
119. See United States v. McVeigh, 964 F. Supp. 313 (D. Colo. 1996) (Order of May 12, 1997);
id. at 315-16 ("While this case was in Oklahoma, all counsel were subject to the limitations imposed by
Rule 27 of the Local Rules Governing Proceedings in the Western District of Oklahoma."); id. at 316
(outline of Order of April 24, 1997); United States v. McVeigh, 931 F. Supp. 756 (D. Colo. 1996) (Order
of June 13, 1996).
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court orders, and to the extent that the government moved for any such sanctions,
they were denied in their entirety.
IX. Organization of the Defense Team
A. Teamwork
Seventeen attorneys from this country represented McVeigh, plus the court
authorized the retention of the London law firm of Kingsley Napley, arguably the
most highly regarded British criminal defense solicitor firm.' Basically, the
defense was organized into six teams with a leader for each. The deputy principal
defense counsel was Rob Nigh, associated with me in private practice before he
became a federal public defender.
Though attorneys shifted over time from team to team, generally Team One was
organized to prepare for the first stage of the trial, the "guilt-innocence" phase and
was led by Nigh. Joining him was Jim Hankins (who handled matters relating to
the Classified Information Procedure Act and the international aspects of the inves-
tigation), Amber McLaughlin (who primarily oversaw the review of the evidence
concerning the Daryl Bridges Telephone Debit Calling Card"'), Robert Warren
(principally responsible for supervision of the investigation of the so-called Roger
Moore robbery'), Holly Hillerman, Christopher Tritico of Houston, Texas
(forensic evidence), Cheryl Ramsey (telephone debit card), and Denver lawyer
Jeralyn Merritt (eyewitness identification).
Team Two was led by Richard Burr, an attorney from Houston, Texas, who
served for many years with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and argued several
death penalty cases before the United States Supreme Court. He was assisted by his
wife, Mandy Welch, admitted to practice in Oklahoma and Texas, and Maurie Levin
of Austin, Texas.
Team Three was headed by Robert L. Wyatt, IV, a member of my firm. This
team was originally designed to control, record, receive, and examine evidence and
other materials obtained from the government through discovery. As information
concerning problem; with the FBI laboratory became public, this team assumed the
additional responsibility of carefully reviewing the forensic evidence and the claims
the government made regarding the evidence and of organizing the defense counter
120. Sir David Naplay, former President of the Law Society of England, was one of the founding
partners of Kingsley Napley. He, along with Christopher Murray and George Carman, Q.C., successfully
represented Jeremy Thorre, the leader of the British Liberal Party, when he was charged with conspiracy
to commit murder, and Sir David represented the individual charged with the attempted assassination
of The Princess Royal, Prncess Anne. See SIR DAVID NAPLEY, NOT WITHOUT PREJUDICE (Harrap,
London 1982). Kingsley Napley was retained by the defense in order to assist us with a factual
investigation in Europe and to obtain experts in bomb trace analysis in the United Kingdom. John
Clitheroe and Christophe: Murray of the firm provided invaluable counsel and advice.
121. The Daryl Brid,,es Pre-paid Calling Card was part of the government's evidence of McVeigh's
involvement, placing calls to set up the requirements for the bombing.
122. The Roger Moore robbery was an alleged robbery in which McVeigh and Nichols stole
weapons that were later sold. The proceeds were supposedly used to finance the bombing of the Murrah
Building.
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attack. Other members of the team were Mike Roberts, Chris Tritico, and Robert
Warren.
Michael Roberts, an attorney with Jones, Wyatt & Roberts, headed Team Four.
Team Four was the management or administrative branch of the defense, that
supervised the preparation of motions to authorize expenses and handled all
administrative management matters except personnel. I handled all personnel
matters. Roberts was assisted by the office manager Ann Seim; Becky Blasier, the
accounting and finance officer; the secretaries, Renae Elmenhorst, Shelly Hager,
Kathryn Irons, Karen Olds and, Karen Warner; staff assistant Scott Anderson;
Colorado attorney Steven England; John Jones, Desi Milacek, Trish Pierpoint, Nic
Merritt, Daphne Burlingham, Kelly Cherry, Rebecca Winters, Leah Kling, and Chad
Wold.
Team Five was the legal counsel office. It was led by Professor Randy Coyne of
the University of Oklahoma College of Law, an academic expert on death penalty
litigation and the author of a law school textbook on capital punishment."
Team Six served as the litigation support team and was headed by Sam
Guiberson, a Houston, Texas, attorney. In addition to supervising and operating our
computer retrieval and screening system, Guiberson's office was also responsible for
preparing transcripts of court-authorized electronic interceptions of conversations of
the Fortiers and members of McVeigh's family. Sam Guiberson's team included
Chuck Miller, a computer expert, and attorneys Margaret Vandenbrook, Maria Ryan,
Francesca Castaldi, Kristan Tucker, Lorraine Derbes, and Michelle Mears. The last
four team members were invaluable to us in analyzing and preparing for the cross-
examination of Lori and Michael Fortier using the electronic interceptions of the
telephone conversations.
Ann Bradley, a Georgetown University Law Student, served as our researcher and
aide de camp and assisted me significantly with media inquiries and the collection
of material for closing argument. Dr. Kent L. Tedin of the University of Houston
Department of Political Science assisted in the change of venue motion. One of the
most helpful members of the defense team was Linda S. Thomas, a lawyer in
Anchorage, Alaska, whose specialty is "vetting" the other side's experts. As a result
of a number of things that Thomas learned about government experts, many of them
were not called to testify. Michael Stout, an attorney from Roswell, New Mexico,
spent three days assisting us in preparation for the voir dire of the jury. Several law
students served as interns. They included Michael Grote and Alicia Carpenter, both
from the University of Missouri Law School, Trent Luckinbill and Hoss Paruizian
from the University of Oklahoma, and Heidi McLemore.
Broadcast News of Mid-America, Inc. and its President, Joe Taylor, of Tulsa,
Oklahoma, were retained to provide us transcripts of daily news programs which
might furnish investigative leads and assist in the investigation and prosecution of
a change of venue motion. J. Neil Hartley, an investigator from Austin, Texas, and
Lee Norton and Associates from Tallahassee, Florida, were primarily responsible
123. See RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1994).
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for the investigation of mitigating factors. In addition, Neil served as witness
coordinator for the defense. Lee Norton was assisted by her associate, Lisa Moody.
Ann Cole of New York and Sandy Marks of Miami, Florida, were our jury selection
experts. On various occasions the internationally recognized and highly regarded
law firm of Baker & McKenzie provided timely assistance to us on a professional
basis without charge. British and Irish barristers and solicitors freely gave of their
knowledge and experience in defense of bombing cases.
In representing McVeigh, the defense became familiar with some of the
government's most advanced techniques for intelligence gathering in criminal
investigations. I met the Attorney General of the United States and had a tour of
the Murrah Building at 6:30 a.m. on the day following my appointment. One
member of the defense team was authorized to carry a concealed weapon at all
times. There were over a half-dozen serious security incidents at my home,
precipitating the need for armed guards on our property for two-and-a-half years.
The FBI investigated threats against my life.
The defense viewed the photographs of 168 men, women, and children taken
where their bodies were found, recovered, and identified. I held in my hands the leg
that cannot be matched to any of the victims. The defense was present at the
disinterment of Ms. Levy's body in New Orleans.
We met most of the nation's leading media celebrities, as well as some very
bizarre, paranoid, and fanatical people. I traveled to China, Hong Kong, Macau, and
the Muslim areas of the South Philippines. We interviewed one of the world's
leading terrorists who was in custody of law enforcement officials. I cross the
Allenby Bridge over the Jordan River and entered the West Bank. I traveled to
Damascus, Amman, and the Golan Heights from the Syrian side. We traveled by
jumbo jet, airbus, automobiles, taxis, an occasional limousine (that we paid for our
of our own pockets), foot, small aircraft, bicycles, and even by camel. We met with
individuals, potential witnesses, and experts in the cloistered confines of King's
College, London, the elegant Atheneum Club overlooking the Mall in London, a
beautiful Scottish church, lean-to shacks in the Philippines, Bedouin tents in the
West Bank, laboratories in the Weizmann Institute in Israel, and for four nights I
was a guest in one of the most famous terrorist bombing sites in the world, the King
David Hotel in Jerualem. We met in secret locations with members of international
Jewish organizations, both in the United States and abroad, who were as interested
in American Neo-Nazis and their connection with the bombing as I was. Also, I
met with representatives of the world's most successful terrorist organization, the
Provisional Irish Republican Army. We traveled by rail to Wales, Edinburgh, and
Northern Ireland.
We stopped and interviewed witnesses in small towns located in the deserts of
Arizona and rural co-ops in Kansas. We reviewed satellite photographs of
downtown Oklahoma City and rural Kansas.
B. Expert Assistance
Defense investigators were Blair Abbott and Christine Hoover of Arizona, David
Fechheimer, Josiah Thompson, author of the bestseller Six Seconds in Dallas, and
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John Bates, retired from the Scotland Yard Special Branch. Investigators in Hong
Kong and the Philippines included Richard Reyna,'" Roger Charles, John Pierce,
Marty Reed, and Wilma Sparks. Ed Simonson of TeleDesign Management of
Burlingame, California, and his staff were our consulting experts with respect to the
Daryl Bridges Debit Calling Card. John Wootters, Jr., of Kerrville, Texas, served
as a consulting expert on firearms and weapons.
Other experts for bomb trace analysis were Dr. Keith Borer of Durham, England,
Dr. Brian Caddy of Glasgow, Scotland (appointed by the British Home Secretary,
Sir Michael Howard, to investigate allegations concerning the forensic laboratory
of the British Ministry of Defense), z and Dr. John Lloyd, retired Senior
Pathologist from the British Home Office.'" Finally, the defense was assisted by
Dr. Jehuda Yinon, Senior Research Fellow at the Weizmann Institute of Science in
Rehovot, Israel,'21 and Sid Woodcock of Kirkland, Washington, a well-known
explosives expert. Dr. Roy Godson of Georgetown University agreed to serve
without compensation as an expert for us with respect to matters concerning
terrorism. Dr. Stephen Sloan of the University of Oklahoma, a world recognized
expert on terrorists and terrorism," and Seth Meisel, his assistant, from Berkeley,
California, advised the defense on a consulting basis with respect to issues of
terrorism. Retired San Francisco bomb squad detective, Donald L. Hansen, was
retained as an expert witness with respect to the government's evidence concerning
the bomb.
Michael Crawford, M.D., an Oklahoma City board certified internist, was
employed as an expert to conduct certain physical examinations of our client. David
Foster, M.D., a psychiatrist from Auburn, California, John Smith, M.D., a
psychiatrist from Oklahoma City, and Seymour Halleck, M.D., a psychiatrist from
the University of North Carolina, conducted examinations of McVeigh to determine
his competency for trial. They were assisted by Anthony Semone, a clinical
psychologist from Wyndmoor, Pennsylvania.
Peter Tytell,'" one of the world's leading question document experts, gave
124. For a description of Richard Reyna's work, see NICK DAVIES, WHITE LIES, RAPE, MURDER
AND JUsTICE, TEXAS STYLE (1991).
125. See Brian Caddy, Assessment and Implications of Centrifuge Contamination in the Trace
Explosive Section of the Forensic Explosive Laboratory at Ft. Halstead (Dec. 1996) (presented to
Parliament by the Right Honorable Michael Howard, the Secretary of State for the Home Department
by Command of Her Majesty) (on file with author). Professor Caddy's credentials include: B.Sc., Ph.D.,
CChem, MRSC, Director of the Forensic Science Unit, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.
126. Lloyd gave evidence that led to the clearing of the so-called Birmingham Six who were
accused of the largest terrorist act in Great Britain: the bombing of a public house in Birmingham,
England, that killed 21 people. See BOB WOFFINDEN, MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (1987); Ludovic
Kennedy, I Accuse, SUNDAY TIMES (London), at C1 (Feb. 25, 1990); A Terrible Truth Unfolds,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 1991, at 58; see also IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER (Universal Pictures 1993)
(highly popular British movie).
127. Dr. Yinon is the author of the only textbook on bomb trace analysis in the English speaking
world. See JEHUDA YINON & SHMUEL ZITRIN, MODERN METHODS AND APPLICATIONS IN ANALYSIS OF
EXPLOSIVES (1993).
128. See SEAN ANDERSON & STEPHEN SLOAN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF TERRORISM (1995).
129. Tytell's father, Martin, was a consulting expert for Alger Hiss. See ALLEN WEINSTEIN,
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
invaluable consulting assistance, as did the psychologist Gary Wells from Iowa State
University and Elizabeth Loftus from the University of Washington."' Professor
M. Yasar Iscan of the Department of Anthropology of Florida Atlantic University
was retained to provide consulting and expert testimony with respect to the
"unidentified leg" issue.'
Some individuals providing invaluable assistance were Aaron Zelman (gun
control), Peter DeForest (tool mark examiner), Mark Denbeaux (document
examiner), Hammet Photography, Emricks Moving and Storage of Enid, Ikon LDS
(coding and scanning), Tammy Krause (victim impact), George Krisvosta (tool mark
examiner), Litidex (scanning and coding), Herbert MacDonnell (fingerprints), Peter
McDonald (tire imprints), Patricia Matthews (filming), Mike McNulty (Waco),
William McQuay (fingerprints), Richard Murray (venue), James Pate (Waco), Skip
Palenik (hair and fiber), Donald Streufert (victim impact), Rimkus Consulting Group
(chemist), Anthony Rockwood (weather), Jasa, Dahl Towland (venue), Richard
Sanders (audio and video), Alan Scheflin, Howard Zehr (victim impact), Laird
Wilcox (penalty phase), Wiss Janney Elster Associates (engineers), Kathy Roberts
(still and video photography), and Laurie Mylroie, Ph.D. (Iraq).
To assist the defense in reviewing videotapes in something other than "real time"
and also to provide magnification and enhancement, the court authorized us to retain
Owl Investigation, Inc., and its President, Tom Owen, from New York. The well
known sociologist, Stuart Wright, and his research assistant, Dean Peet, and
Dick Reavis, the author of The Ashes of Waco,' assisted us in understanding the
issues concerning the Branch Davidians. Richard Post, a retired Central Intelligence
Agency employee, helped us greatly on matters concerning intelligence, particularly
in the Far East and in the Middle East. Art Reed of Enid and James D. Weiskopf
of Clifton, Virginia, assisted the defense in reviewing military records.
Finally, the defense was assisted by Dr. T. K. Marshall, C.B.E. M.D. F.R.C. Path.
of Belfast, Northern Ireland, who was the retired Chief State Pathologist for
Northern Ireland and who has performed more autopsies and medical examinations
of victims of ammonium nitrate bombs than any other person in the world. Dr.
Marshall gave "very high marks" to the Oklahoma State Medical Examiner, Fred
Jordan, and his staff. It was Dr. Marshall who gave compelling testimony
concerning the unidentified leg.
It is important that I note my indebtedness to my old friend, D.C. Thomas, for
his wise counsel and support when I needed it. I must also thank Gerry Spence and
Richard Haynes, two outstanding lawyers, for their public support, and John D.
McKenzie, senior editorial writer (legal issues) for the New York Times.
PERJURY, THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE 571-75 (1975).
130. Both Drs. Loftus and Wells are well recognized experts on the question of eyewitness
identification and have written and published widely.
131. The State Medical Examiner's Office reported that there were eight victims with traumatically
amputated left legs but found nine left legs. The ninth leg could not be matched to any known victim.
See Jim Killackey, Leg Believed Part of 169th Bomb Victim, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 16, 1995, at 1.
132. See ARMAGEDDON AT WACO (Stuart Wright ed., 1995).
133. DICK REAVIS, THE ASHES OF WACO (1995).
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X. Pre-trial Evidentiary Decisions
A. Handwriting Samples to the Grand Jury
On July 18, 1995, on our advice, McVeigh appeared before the grand jury and
refused to comply with a grand jury subpoena ordering him to submit a writing
exemplar."34 That same day, we submitted a brief supporting his reasons for
noncompliance.'35 Our first ground for objection was that handwriting exemplars
are unnecessary to make an adequate probable cause determination supporting an
indictment and were instead being sought as evidence for trial, a violation of the use
of a grand jury indictment."3 Second, we argued that the motion to compel
compliance with the subpoena should be denied as an equitable remedy for alleged
violations of grand jury secrecy.' Finally, we argued that providing the
handwriting exemplars would violate McVeigh's Fifth Amendment privilege by
revealing his thought processes.'
In response, the court conducted a hearing that allowed both us and the
government to present oral arguments. We presented nine reasons for refusing
compliance with the directive.' In addition to the three reasons put forth in the
brief, we argued that the request for the exemplar was the result of illegal electronic
surveillance, that the exemplars were being sought for use in another grand jury
matter in a different district, that the subpoena was overly broad, that the request
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of McVeigh's Fourth
Amendment rights, and that the evidence would be used in trials in Michigan.Y
The court held that compliance with the directive did not violate McVeigh's
constitutional rights and the other allegations did not relate to whether compliance
was proper.'
McVeigh refused to comply with this court order and the court considered
whether to charge civil or criminal contempt against him." Finding that ap-
plication of civil contempt proceedings would be a futile exercise and that criminal
contempt proceedings were outweighed by the costs involved, the court did not
charge McVeigh with contempt for his refusal to comply.4
134. See United States v. McVeigh, 896 F. Supp. 1549, 1551 (W.D. Okla. 1995).
135. See Defendant McVeigh's Memorandum of Law Objecting to Entry of Order Memorializing
Refusal to Provide Handwriting Exemplars in the Absence of a Due Process Hearing; Alternative
Memorandum Why Contempt Is Not Appropriate, July 25, 1995, United States v. McVeigh, 896 F. Supp.
1549 (W.D. Okla. 1995) (No. M-95-98-H).
136. See McVeigh, 896 F. Supp at 1551.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1551-52.
139. See id. at 1552.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 1553.
143. See id. at 1555-56. The court also noted that McVeigh's objection to the use as evidence at
trial of an order memorializing his noncompliance must await notice of the government's intent to use
such, and was thus premature at this point. See id. Additionally, the court reviewed the defendant's
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B. Suppression of Evidence
1. McVeigh's Personal Effects
When McVeigh was initially arrested in Perry, Oklahoma, his clothes and
personal effects ware placed in custody where they were taken by an FBI inves-
tigator on April 21I " Though a warrant had been issued for those effects earlier
in the day, it was not presented to the sheriff who held them and it was later
returned to the issuing court as being unexecuted. 5 We issued a motion reques-
ting that the evidence taken be suppressed, arguing that the transfer and removal of
the property by the FBI to its laboratory without a warrant violated McVeigh's
Fourth Amendment rights."
The court held that the taking of the property without a warrant was supported
by United States v. Edwards.47 Characterizing the relevant inquiry as whether
McVeigh had any privacy rights to deny access to his personal effects by the FBI
when he was lawfully in jail, the court held that his property was lawfully taken.'
2. Nichols' Statements
When Nichols surrendered to local authorities on April 21, 1995, in response to
hearing his name associated with the bombing, he made several statements to the
FBI investigators.'49 Nichols sought to have those statements suppressed in his
case."5° They were was not."
Perhaps more importantly, we sought to have the statements suppressed in the
case against lvMcVeigh." The government argued that the statements were
admissible as statements against interest under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence."' The first requirement under the rule is that the declarant be
unavailable, and that includes being unavailable to testify because he is exempted
based on privilege." The second requirement is that a reasonable person would
not have made the statement knowing that it would subject him to criminal liability
absent a belief that it was true."S
objections to compliance and found them to be without merit. See id. at 1562.
144. See United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1541, 1545 (D. Colo. 1996).
145. See id. at 1547.
146. See id. at 1555.
147. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
148. See McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. at 1557.
149. See id. at 1558.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 1561.
152. See id. at 1566.
153. See Brief of the United States in Support of Motion in Limine Regarding Terry Nichols'
Statements, Feb. 22, 1S96, United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Colo. 1996) (No. CR-95-
110-A).
154. See id. at 3.
155. See id.
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The court held that the statements were inadmissible hearsay and did not fit
within any of the defined exceptions to the hearsay rule.'" The court held that
while Nichols did fit within the declarant unavailable requirement, he did not fit
within the second requirement." The court held that even the agents interviewing
Nichols knew that he was telling a story that the authorities wanted to hear and
thus, Nichols could not believe that the statements he made were true.5 , For that
reason, the statements were hearsay inadmissible against McVeigh.'59
C. Production of Classified Information
The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) enables the government to
discover, prior to trial, the classified information possessed by the defendant so that
there can be an evaluation of its effects on national security.'" Then a hearing is
held before the court so that it can rule on its admissibility.'' That hearing may
be held in camera if the Attorney General certifies that a public hearing may result
in classified information being disclosed." The government is required to provide
any information it may use to rebut the classified information at trial, and failure
to do so may result in the government being unable to admit the rebuttal evidence
at trial."
The government argued that the CIPA was not an expansion of the discovery
rights already provided to a criminal defendant and was not an entitlement to seek
classified information that is otherwise undiscoverable. ' Instead it argued that the
information sought by McVeigh was not discoverable and, therefore, the CIPA did
not apply."
We countered by arguing that the government was misapplying the test.'" We
argued that there must first be a showing that the material is discoverable, then a
determination as to whether it is admissible under the CIPA." We agreed that the
CIPA did not expand the discovery rights of an individual, but it did not prevent
discovery simply because the information is classified."' Rather, we argued that
156. See McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. at 1567-71.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 1570-71.
159. See id. at 1571.
160. See Defendant McVeigh's Memorandum to the Court Concerning Implementation of the
Classified Information Procedures Act at 2 (Mar. 8, 1996), United States v. McVeigh, 923 F. Supp. 1310
(D. Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CR-68M).
161. See id. at 7.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 7-8.
164. See Brief of the United States in Response to Defendant McVeigh's Motions Seeking Discovery
under the Classified Information Procedures Act at I (Mar. 26, 1996), United States v. McVeigh, 923
F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CR-68M).
165. See id. at 6-13.
166. See Defendant McVeigh's Response to the Government's Reply to Defendant McVeigh's
Motion Seeking Classified Information at 1-2 (Apr. 3, 1996), McVeigh (No. 96-CR-68-M).
167. See id.
168. See icL at 2-3.
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material is discoverable if it is relevant and material to the defendant's case and that
the information being sought by McVeigh fit both criteria."
The court held that the request to mandate compliance with the CIPA guidelines
was at that time premature.70 However, it held that there "is a strong suggestion
that classified information in these agency records would be helpful in pursuing the
investigation of the defendant's suspicions.'' Indeed, it stated that if the
government must provide copies of classified information, it had the option of
declassifying, redacting, or placing the information under a protective order."
D. Complying with Rule 16 and Brady
In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court recognized a defen-
dant's right to receive any exculpatory and impeaching evidence. Rule 16(a)(1)(C)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits discovery of documents that are
material to the preparation of the defense. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. §3500,
provides that witness statements are not to be turned over to the defense counsel
until the witness cestifies.
We argued repeatedly that the government was not complying with its duties
under Rule 16 and Brady.74 Additionally, we argued that the government had a
duty to disclose witness statements pursuant to the Jencks Act.75
The court agreed and held that the government must turn over all of the
exculpatory evidence relating to McVeigh.76 The court held that the purpose of
disclosing exculpatory evidence is to enable the defendant to prepare its defense for
trial." The court held that this entitlement to exculpatory evidence is not altered
by the fact that the material may be contained in witness statements or grand jury
testimony.' Thus, the government was ordered to turn over all the evidence,
including grand jury testimony and witness statements, containing exculpatory or
impeaching information.''
169. See id. at 3-4.
170. See United States v. McVeigh, 923 F. Supp. 1310, 1314 (D. Colo. 1996).
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
174. See McVeigh, 923 F. Supp. at 1314-15.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 1316.
177. See id. at 1315.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 1316. It should be noted that a later Brady and Jencks request regarding the
production of materils relating to a deposition of Thomas Manning was denied because the court felt
that the witness' testimony was not impermissibly obtained and any notes of the attorney were not
affirmed or adopted by the witness. See United States v. MeVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 1454, 1456-57 (D. Colo.
1997).
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E. A Daubert Hearing
Counsel for both Nichols and McVeigh argued that application of Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.," required a hearing outside the presence of
the jury to determine the results from laboratory testing of chemical residue on
clothing and personal property of McVeigh.' We suggested that the articles had
been contaminated, that improper protocols had been followed, that improper
methodologies were used, and that unqualified persons participated in the perfor-
mance of the tests." Thus, we argued that the government must prove to the
court that the appropriate scientific methods were used prior to the conclusions and
results being admitted as evidence.'
The court held that there is a substantial difference between admissibility of
evidence and the reliability of it." The court stated "Daubert does not substitute
the judge for the jury as the factfinder for scientific issues. It requires only that the
court protect the jury from the influence of opinion testimony that does not have a
proper foundation in the methods of science." 'g The court then postponed any
decisions as to the admission of the evidence until it was presented as such at
trial.'"
XI. Severance
We submitted a Motion for Severance and Brief in Support one day before
Nichols. We argued that severance was necessary for several reasons." Among
those were that Nichols and McVeigh had antagonistic defenses and had made
prejudicial statements agai'nst each other." Also, we argued that the potential
capital sentence and right to individualized sentencing prohibited trying the men
jointly. 9 Finally, we argued that the possibility of harm caused by the
government's intended use of statements made by Nichols against him at trial, but
ruled inadmissible as to McVeigh, is too great in a capital case."
The government argued in response that the defendants were co-conspirators and
aiders/abettors, and a joint trial would result in administrative efficiency.' Also,
180. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
181. See United States v. McVeigh, 955 F. Supp. 1278, 1279 (D. Colo. 1997).
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 1280.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1281.
187. See Defendant McVeighs Motion for Severance of Defendants and Brief in Support at 1-3
(Sept. 4, 1996), United States v. McVeigh, 169 F.R.D. 362 (D. Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CR-68-M).
188. See id at 27-46.
189. See id. at 46-87.
190. See id. Nichols' objections to ajoint trial were similar except that he argued in the alternative
that severance should occur for the penalty phase. See Motion of Defendant Terry Lynn Nichols for
Severance at the Guilt and Penalty Phases of Trial and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof at 87-
88, Sept. 6, 1996, United States v. McVeigh, 169 F.R.D. 362 (D. Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CR-68-M).
191. See Brief of United States in Opposition to Severance at 21-23, Sept. 25, 1996, McVeigh (No.
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the government argued that any prejudice could be reduced by a limiting instruc-
tion." Urging the court to reject the defendants' motions, the government stated
that considerations favoring joint trials in noncapital cases are equally applicable in
capital cases." The court disagreed." '
Judge Matsch stated that joinder is appropriate under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure unless the risk of prejudice to the co-defendants outweighs
the benefits. 5 "Thre presumed benefits of a joint trial must be weighed against the
potential for harm to the integrity of the trial process."'" Judge Matsch recognized
the uniqueness of this specific capital trial, as is evidenced by his statements: "Even
risk of a mistrial o:r reversible error may be acceptable under certain circumstances.
This is not such a case. The nature and scope'of the charges, the quantity of the
evidence and the intensity of the public interest in all aspects of this criminal
proceeding compel caution and restraint in ruling on these motions." ' 7 He
identified the relevant inquiry as determining whether severance is necessary to
ensure confidence in the outcome by providing fundamental fairness.' Ultimately
deciding that the possibility of harm to McVeigh from admission of Nichols'
statements outweighed the benefits derived from a joint trial, Judge Matsch ruled
in favor of severance.'9
XII. The Trial
A. The First Stage
The government's case against Tim McVeigh, as widely predicted in the press,
centered around six main issues. The government's witness list identified over 327
potential witnesse3.n The first issue was the testimony of Michael and Lori
Fortier as cooperating witnesses for the government. The second point was the
arrest of McVeigh by Oklahoma State Trooper Charles Hanger one mile south of
the Billings, Oklahoma exit off Interstate 35 approximately an hour and a half after
96-CR-68-M).
192. See id. at 52-53.
193. See id. at 69-70.
194. See United States v. McVeigh, 169 F.R.D. 362, 371 (1996).
195. See id. at 363-64.
196. Id. at 364.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 368. In fact, he stated:
Timothy McVeigh will be profoundly prejudiced by a joint trial of this case. His lawyers
cannot question Terry Nichols or cross-examine the FBI agents on what they say Terry
Nichols said anl they cannot control the cross-examination by Terry Nichols or follow
up on any suggestions or inferences of guilt of Timothy McVeigh resulting from it. The
latter may have the more severe prejudicial effect if Mr. Nichols' lawyers implicitly accuse
Timothy McVeigh of lying to Terry Nichols. In short, Timothy McVeigh may be caught
in cross-fire.
Id. at 369.
200. The government actually called a total of 141 witnesses in both stages. In contrast, the defense
called 25 witnesses in the first stage and 26 witnesses in the second stage.
[Vol. 51:617
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol51/iss4/2
1998] DEFENDING THE "MOST HATED MAN IN AMERICA" 645
the bombing. The third issue centered around reports from the FBI forensic
laboratory concerning the examination of certain tangible objects that allegedly tied
McVeigh to the bomb. The fourth issue was the Darrell Bridges' Telephone Debit
Calling Card, sometimes known as the "spotlight" calling card. The fifth issue was
McVeigh's political opinions. The final issue was the purported identification of
McVeigh as Robert Kling, the individual who rented the Ryder truck in Junction
City, Kansas, on April 17, 1995. It was this truck that the government said carried
the bomb that exploded outside the Murrah Building.
The defense could not dispute the second and fifth issues. That is to say,
McVeigh's arrest by Trooper Hanger and McVeigh's political opinions were
established facts. The defense did have significantly different interpretations than
those offered by the government. McVeigh's political views, while in many cases
extreme, were no different than perhaps the average Pat Buchanan supporter, and
his views towards some aspects of federal law enforcement are probably shared by
several million people, judging from the reaction of some to the incidents at Ruby
Ridge and Waco. McVeigh's arrest near Billings, we contended, actually helped the
defense. We argued that there was simply insufficient time, given the nature of
McVeigh's automobile, for McVeigh to have traveled from Oklahoma City at the
time of the bombing to the place where Trooper Hanger arrested him. The other
four contentions were all hotly disputed.
Michael and Lori Fortier received significant benefits from the government in
return for testimony that was now 180 degrees from what they had said in the
several weeks following the bombing. In addition, their exposure to drug charges
made them eligible for greater prison sentences than Michael Fortier could or would
receive for pleading guilty to the charges in connection with the bombing. Also, we
attempted to demonstrate the inconsistency and lack of credibility of Michael and
Lori Fortier, and heavily cross-examined them regarding their tape recorded
statements about making a million dollars off the case. We aftempted to
demonstrate that almost every "fact" to which they testified was available in
newspapers and other media sources available to them before they began to
"correct" their stories.
We challenged the Darrell Bridges Debit Card on several grounds, including the
fact that it was impossible to prove who actually made the calls in question. We
also pointed out that a debit card, unlike a credit card, does not have an electronic
chain of billing. The billing instead must be recreated out of millions of telephone
records, greatly increasing the possibility of error.
The testimony of the so-called eye witnesses was offered at only minimal levels
by the government. I believe that cross-examination at the hearing to suppres eye
witness identification testimony destroyed the credibility of several of hose
witnesses and hence the government did not call them at trial. The witnesses gave
conflicting statements about McVeigh's-Kling's physical appearance. Some o0 the
descriptions were inconsistent with obvious features of McVeigh's face, weight, and
clothing.
Of particular assistance to the defense was a video tape of McVeigh at the
McDonald's in Junction City approximately twenty minutes before the Ryder truck
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was rented. The tape showed him wearing clothing remarkably different from that
described as being worn by Kling when the truck was rented a few minutes later.
The defense was assisted in the cross-examination of the FBI witnesses as a result
of access to the Inspector General's report of its investigation into the FBI lab. The
report was shockin, in its revelation of shoddy scientific work. It described the
work, of the lab in many high profile cases as nothing more than working backwards
to support the field agent's hypothesis of guilt. The laboratory was engaged in
forensic prostitution. Its most capable and outstanding bomb trace analyst (as
certified by his boss and his boss' superior) was purposely left out of the Oklahoma
City investigation. Judge Matsch ordered depositions to be taken of key FBI
laboratory personnel by the defense.
B. The Second Stage
The government relied in the second stage, much as it did in the first stage, on
victim witnesses' testimony. The testimony was emotionally drenching and gut
wrenching. The defense called numerous witnesses, friends and neighbors of
McVeigh, co-workers, family members, school teachers, military buddies, and others
who painted a dramatically different picture of McVeigh than that to which the
nation had been exposed by the unfair and prejudicial news coverage.
The defense also wanted to prove as a matter of fact and law that the government
committed murder against the Branch Davidians at Waco. Judge Matsch, however,
restricted the defense to evidence of sources that McVeigh had used. Since many
of these sources were themselves inflammatory, lacking objectivity, and containing
demonstratively false statements, the defense was not likely assisted by this limited
evidence. Had the j ary heard the complete evidence concerning Waco, the verdict
in the second stage may well have been different. We argued to the court that since
the government said the motive for the bombing was McVeigh's hatred of the
government for what it did at Waco, we were entitled to show what the government
did at Waco.
XIII. The Death Penalty
A. Attempted Disqualification of Attorney General Janet Reno
The government is required under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, in
advance of a trial for a capital charge, to give notice to the defendant of its intention
to seek the death penalty. ° The United States Attorneys' Manual mandates that
a three-step analysis will occur before a decision is made to seek the death
penalty.0 On the clay of the bombing, April 19, 1995, Attorney General Janet
201. See 18 U.S.C. f§ 3591-3598 (1994).
202. See Motion to Disqualify Attorney Janet Reno and All Other Officers and Employees of the
Department of Justice from Participation in Decision Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, and to Preclude
Seeking the Death Penaltt Until a Lawful Prosecutorial Decision Can Be Made Whether to Seek It, July
25, 1995, United States v. McVeigh, 890 F. Supp. 1549 (W.D. Okla. 1995) (No. M-95-98-H).
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Reno announced her intention to seek the death penalty against the individual who
committed the crime.'n
After McVeigh became a suspect, President Bill Clinton announced that the
government would seek the death penalty.' The government then feigned
compliance with the three-step analysis.' We argued that because the decision
to seek the death penalty was not given proper consideration, application of it would
be improper.'
We argued that the U.S. Attorney guidelines created a liberty interest, and failure
to comply with them results in the violation of an individual's due process rights
under the Fifth Amendment.' Also, failure to comply with guidelines deprived
McVeigh of a meaningful determination of his sentence.'
The government disagreed and argued that the motion constituted an
"unprecedented intrusion into the exercise of prosecutorial discretion."' Ad-
ditionally, the government urged that the guidelines did not create a liberty interest
but are instead internal guidance protocols.21
B. Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty
On October 20, 1995, the government filed its Notice of Intention to Seek the
Death Penalty as to Defendant Timothy James McVeigh.' Therein the
government listed various statutory and nonstatutory aggravating factors that would
enhance and make a sentence eligible for the death penalty by providing in-
dividualized sentencing."
We moved to strike the notice under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments and Rule
Seven of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure! 3 We argued that the decision
to seek the death penalty was made arbitrarily and irrationally. 4 Then we
attacked each of the proposed aggravating factors separately."5 Finally, we argued
203. See id. at 3.
204. See idL
205. See id. at 4.
206. See id. at 9-10 (stating that this failure denied McVeigh his due process rights).
207. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Disqualify Attorney Janet Reno and All
Other Officers and Employees of the Department of Justice from Participation in Decision Whether to
Seek the Death Penalty, and to Preclude Seeking the Death Penalty Until a Lawful Prosecutorial Decision
Can Be Made Whether to Seek It at 6-12, July 25, 1995, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
208. See id. at 16.
209. Brief of the United States in Opposition to Motion to Disqualify the Attorney General and All
Officers of the Department of Justice and to Preclude the Government from Seeking the Death Penalty
at 1, Aug. 9, 1995, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
210. See id. at 3-7.
211. See Notice of Intention to Seek the Death Penalty as to Defendant Timothy James Mcveigh,
Oct. 20, 1995, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
212. See id. at 2-4.
213. See Motion to Strike Notice of Intention to Seek the Death Penalty as to Defendant Timothy
James McVeigh, Nov. 20, 1995, McVeigh (No. M-95-98-H).
214. See id.
215. See id.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
that under any and all circumstances, the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment and should therefore be precluded." 6
The court upheld the government's right to seek the death penalty.1 7 First, the
court took notice that the requests for disqualification of Attorney General Janet
Reno were rendered moot by the filing of the notice of intent to seek the death
penalty."8 While Judge Matsch agreed that the arguments contained therein were
relevant to a deterraination of whether application of the death penalty was proper,
he held that the decision was one of prosecutorial discretion." 9 As to the conten-
tion by McVeigh that allowing the death penalty violated his Sixth and Eighth
Amendment rights, Judge Matsch held that there was no evidence suggesting the
notices were filed because of any discriminatory motive, invidious classification, or
improper motive."1 Despite the fact that there is language that appears to limit
consideration of the death penalty under 18 U.S.C. §3592 to those specific
aggravating facton; included therein, other courts have read similar statutes to
include nonstatutory aggravators."' Thus, said the court, application of the death
penalty is appropriate.' Finally, the court stated that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in McKlesky v. Kemp "m foreclosed any argument that the death
penalty is per se unconstitutional. On June 13, the jury returned a verdict of death.
XIV. Appeal
Following imposition of judgment and sentence against McVeigh on August 14,
I filed a timely Notice of Appeal with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
appeal included nine main issues:
[1] pre-trial publicity unfairly prejudiced [McVeigh], [2] juror
misconduct precluded his right to a fair trial, [3] the district court erred
by excluding evidence that someone else may have been guilty, [4] the
district court improperly instructed the jury on the charged offenses, [5]
the district court erred by admitting victim impact testimony during the
guilt phase of trial, [6] the district court did not allow [McVeigh] to
conduct adequate voir dire to discover juror bias as to sentencing, [7]
the district court erred by excluding during the penalty phase mitigating
evidence that someone else may have been involved in the bombing, [8]
the district court erred by excluding during the penalty phase mitigating
evidence showing the reasonableness of McVeigh's beliefs with regard
to events at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, and [9] the
216. See id.
217. See United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478 (D. Colo. 1996).
218. See id.
219. See id
220. See i.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. 481 U.S. 279, 300-03 (1987) (finding the death penalty constitutional).
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victim impact testimony admitted during the penalty phase produced a
sentence based on emotion rather than reason.'
On September 8, 1998, The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision. '
Regarding the first issue, McVeigh claimed that his right to due process of law
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and his right to an
impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment was denied.' The reason for these
violations of his constitutional rights was that the effect of the negative pretrial
publicity on the jury caused both presumed and actual prejudice.m The two types
of prejudice are subject to different standards of review.'
A. Presumed Prejudice
Presumed prejudice requires the reviewing court to examine the specific publicity,
the surrounding circumstances, and to determine whether the reasonable juror
subjected to this publicity could render an impartial decision.m The reviewing
court evaluates all circumstances of the publicity de novo."
The negative publicity involves the media exposure McVeigh received upon his
arrest and alleged confession stories that ran in the Dallas Morning News and
Playboy, first in their online publications and then in their printed publications."
To counter the widespread media attention, the district court transferred venue to
Denver, Colorado, where it immediately notified potential jurors of their invol-
vement in the case and warned them against reading any materials that might carry
news about the case 2 Regarding the alleged confessions, the jurors were asked
specifically if they read them." Only four had read them, and those four
expressed doubt about the validity of the alleged confessions.'
In denying McVeigh relief on this issue, the Tenth Circuit noted that the
defendant bears the burden of showing that the publicity displaced the judicial
process and in doing so, denied the defendant his constitutional rights. 5 The court
held that McVeigh failed to meet his burden because he received a change of venue,
and television images of him in custody failed to inflame the public to the extent
required for a finding of prejudice.' With respect to the articles containing the
alleged confession, the court stated that defense counsel's strong denial of their
224. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998).
225. See id.
226. See id. at 1179.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 1180.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 1180-81.
234. See id. at 1181.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 1182.
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validity weakened their prejudicial effects. Additionally, the articles contained
only second- or third-hand accounts of the events in the alleged confessions, thus
lessening their impact." Finally, the district court issued to the jurors strong
admonitions to disregard anything they might read or hear about in the media."
For these reasons, the Tenth Circuit held that McVeigh received no presumption of
prejudice from the jury.'
B. Actual Prejudice
Actual prejudice is examined with great deference to the trial court." The
"determination of whether the seated jury could remain impartial in the face of
negative pretrial publicity, and the measures that may be taken to ensure such
impartiality, lay squiarely withirn the domain of the trial court."U The reviewing
court looks at whether the trial court abused its discretion regarding the specific
circumstances of the publicity and the voir dire that was conducted."
McVeigh argued that the jury admonitions served to heighten the jurors' interest
in the publicity surrounding the trial.' The Tenth Circuit held that evidence of
that fact would result if a large number of jurors admitted they had read the articles,
and that was not the case.' Additionally, the circuit court stated that the seated
jury was thoroughly examined during voir dire regarding any preconceived ideas
formed as a result of the media.' Each juror filled out two questionnaires and
underwent questioning for approximately an hour per juror. 7 "Questioning by the
court and the parties goes a long way towards ensuring that any prejudice, no matter
how well hidden, will be revealed."uB Finally, the jurors who had read something
about the alleged confessions stated that they could remain impartial, and their
verity was determined by the trial court.' The Tenth Circuit held that for these
reasons, there was no actual prejudice toward McVeigh, and thus his first claim
failed?"
C. Juror Misconduct
The second issue raised by McVeigh on appeal was that a juror committed
misconduct by deciding McVeigh's guilt before the jury began deliberations, and
that the district court erred by failing to hold a hearing regarding this allegation and
237. See iU
238. See id.
239. See id. at 1183.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 1179.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 1183-84.
245. See id. at 1184.
246. See id
247. See id.
248. Id.
249. See id.
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by not dismissing the juror.' The reviewing court utilized an "abuse of
discretion" standard of review.z
The allegations regarding misconduct stemmed from a conversation in the jury
room that was overheard and reported by an alternate juror.' One of the seated
jurors said when discussing whether the decision would be difficult, "It wouldn't be
very hard. I think we all know what the verdict should be."' Upon hearing this,
the district court sternly admonished the jurors, telling them to keep an open mind
and not to discuss the case. 5 At a conference with counsel, the trial judge refused
to hold a hearing and denied the defense's motion to dismiss the jurorY6
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's decision not to hold a hearing was
not an abuse of discretion.' The court stated that the most serious examples of
juror misconduct involve outside influences on the jury and these instances mandate
a hearing. s8 The court held that intra-jury misconduct is less prejudicial and thus
does not mandate a hearing.' The decision to hold a hearing was within the trial
court's discretion.' The district court already knew much of the information that
would have been revealed during a hearing: what was said, who said it, and who
overheard it.' Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that the court's admonitions to the
jury were sufficient to cure any error the statement may have caused.' Though
the circuit court did state that "holding a hearing would have been preferable so that
the record would be clear,"' it declined to find reversible error.
D. Evidence of Alleged Alternative Perpetrators
McVeigh's third issue involved the exclusion of evidence that suggested there
were other individuals involved in the bombing.' The evidence was excluded at
the trial court because, although the evidence was relevant, the relevance was not
sufficient to meet the standard mandated by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.' The standard of review used when evaluating an exclusion of relevant
evidence claim is whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. The
problem created by the trial court is that it failed to make on the record findings as
251. See id. at 1185.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 1185-86.
256. See icL at 1186.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 1187.
262. See id. at 1188.
263. Id.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id.
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to why the evidence should be excluded. '7 Because of this failure, the appellate
court must conduct a de novo review.
The appellate court held that the evidence was properly excluded because any
relevance it might have was outweighed by its prejudicial effects.' The evidence
was deemed prejudicial because it was generalized and speculative in that the person
who would have testified could only testify to the fact that another group of
individuals shared McVeigh's feelings about the government and also discussed
bombing a federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma."' There was no
evidence that thes,- individuals were involved in the bombing of the Murrah
BuildingY The court held that admission of this evidence would "have led the
jury astray, turning the focus away from whether McVeigh - the only person
whose actions were on trial - bombed the Murrah Building."
M
E. Criminal Intent and Lesser-Included Offenses
The fourth issue argued in McVeigh's appeal was that the district court erred in
refusing to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses found within the mass
destruction offenses and first-degree murder charges, and that the court improperly
instructed the jury on the intent required for commission of the mass destruction
offenses.2' These allegations are reviewed de novo 4
McVeigh argued that the government should have been required to prove that
McVeigh possessed a specific intent to killY 5 The Tenth Circuit stated that
although Congress failed to specify the intent required for commission of the mass
destruction offenses, a "knowingly" standard is sufficient to impose the death
penalty as a result of the conviction. 76 The fact that the phrase "if death results"
is included does nct mean that it is an element of the offense, but it is instead a
sentencing factor.'
With respect to the lesser-included offenses, McVeigh argued that because of the
graduated levels of intent for multiple offenses, the instructions should be similar
to those given for first- and second-degree murderY The Tenth Circuit rejected
the argument that the mass destruction offenses contained graduated levels of intent
and therefore this argument failed because its premise failed.' McVeigh also
argued that the jur should have received instructions on second-degree murder
267. See id. at 1189.
268. See id
269. See id
270. See id at 1191.
271. See id.
272. Id
273. See id at 1192-93.
274. See id at 1193.
275. See idt
276. See id. at 1194.
277. See id. at 1194.
278. See idt at 1197.
279. See id. at 1198.
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being a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder. The district court refused
to so instruct the jury because it believed that for the jury to find McVeigh guilty
of murder of a federal employee, it would have to find premeditation, which is the
only difference between the two degrees."' The Tenth Circuit agreed with the
district court's ruling and therefore denied McVeigh relief on this issue.'
F. Victim Impact Testimony Admitted During the Guilt Phase
The next issue raised by McVeigh was that the district court erred by admitting
testimony identifying deceased victims, describing the impact of the blast, and
discussing the damage caused by the bombing.' McVeigh argued that this
testimony was overly prejudicial and should not have been admitted.M The
reviewing court utilized an abuse of discretion standard of review. 5 However,
four witnesses testified before McVeigh objected to the testimony and the court
reviewed that testimony for plain error.' The objection to the testimony was that
it exceeded that related to the immediate effects of the bombing.'
Upon reviewing the testimony for plain error, the Tenth Circuit held that any
error that resulted from testimony of the long range impact of the explosion was
harmless.' The circuit court held that the testimony relating to victims' personal
histories was allowed and indeed was asked of defense witnesses who testified.'
The testimony given of victims' pre-explosion activities related to the reasons that
they were at the bomb site and thus supported their other testimony.' The
graphic testimony that described the immediate after-effects of the explosion helped
the government prove the element of the offense requiring the destruction to be
massive, and was therefore admissible." The remaining evidence that spoke to
long-term effects of the bombing was harmless error and therefore not rever-
sible.' The error was harmless because the circuit court found sufficient evidence
to support McVeigh's guilt and had the testimony been excluded, the result would
have been the same. 3 Finally, the court ruled that there was no error in allowing
the testimony, despite its cumulative effect of overwhelming the emotions of the
jury, because the government was allowed to introduce testimony reflecting the
magnitude of the crime.'
280. See id.
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284. See id. at 1199.
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286. See id. at 1199-1200.
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G. Death Penalty Voir Dire
McVeigh argued that he was not allowed to voir dire potential jurors properly
concerning their proclivity to vote automatically for the death penalty.S Also,
McVeigh was not allowed to determine whether media exposure improperly biased
the jurors' ability to set punishment.' The appellate court reviews the district
court's decisions regarding voir dire to determine whether an abuse of discretion
occurred.'
The district court refused to allow the defense to ask what is generally referred
to as a "reverse-Witherspoon" question.' 3 The reverse-Witherspoon question,
which arose from a line of cases exemplified by Witherspoon v. Illinois,' seeks
to elicit those jurors who would vote to impose the death penalty automatically upon
finding a defendant guilty of a capital crime.'
The Tenth Circuit held that the denial was not an abuse of discretion because the
questions were no' properly phrased and thus did not fall under the protection the
United States Supreme Court has afforded during voir dire. Indeed, the circuit court
determined that McVeigh's question was much broader in scope because it "is
susceptible of an interpretation asking the juror how she would vote on the evidence
presented at trial.""'
With respect to the questions that sought to highlight those jurors who were so
influenced by the media that they would automatically vote for the death penalty,
the circuit court held that the defense was seeking to determine what jurors thought
of the death penalty in light of the specifics of this case.' The defense is only
allowed to ask those questions which illustrate the jurors' moral disposition with
respect to the death penalty.3 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that excluding
them was not an abuse of discretion.'
The circuit court held that the defense was able to use other ways to "life-qualify"
the jury.' Those ways include extensive written questions, extensive questioning
by the judge, extensive questioning by both parties regarding the impartiality of
prospective jurors, and questioning of some jurors by defense counsel utilizing
appropriately phrased reverse-Witherspoon questions.'
295. See id. at 1205.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See id. at 1206.
299. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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H. Improper Exclusion of Mitigating Evidence
McVeigh argued that the district court improperly excluded from the penalty
phase evidence that someone else may have been involved in the bombing.' This
is the same evidence that was excluded on relevancy grounds from the guilt phase
of the trial.' Despite McVeigh's argument that the exclusion violated his rights
to individualized sentencing under the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence was properly excluded because
McVeigh had already failed to establish its relevancy.'
L Exclusion of Mitigating Evidence Establishing the Reasonableness of Beliefs
McVeigh was allowed to present evidence during the penalty phase of his trial
that was relevant to his opinion regarding the standoff between the federal
government and the Branch Davidians at Waco, Texas."' That testimony was
limited to evidence illustrating his knowledge of the incident and his subjective
perceptions of it on April 19, 1995."' He was not allowed to present evidence as
to the objective wrongfulness of the actions taken by the government?" This,
McVeigh argued, was reversible error."'
Upon review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed 2 4 Using a de novo standard of
review, the court held that specific evidence of how the government handled the
events at Waco was not within McVeigh's knowledge at the time of the bombing
and was properly excluded. 5 The court stated "McVeigh was not involved in the
events at Waco; thus what actually happened there, and what experts think of what
happened, is not part of his character." '316
J. Victim Impact Testimony Admitted in Penalty Phase
The government presented thirty-eight witnesses who testified during the penalty
phase of the trial? 7 Their testimony related to the impact of the bombing on their
lives." McVeigh argued that this testimony "injected a constitutionally intolerable
level of emotion."3 9 Also, he argued that the cumulative effect of the testimony
rendered a verdict based on passion rather than reason?'
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Limiting its analysis to that testimony which exceeded the impact of victims' lives
on the witnesses, tae Tenth Circuit held that it was properly excluded."' The court
also reviewed the cumulative impact of the testimony.m The court evaluated both
using a de novo standard of review. "
The court stated that the impact of the victims' deaths on their families and loved
ones is an obvious illustration of a devastating act.'m Any testimony regarding
specific instances in the victims' lives are "relevant to understanding the uniqueness
of the life lost and the impact of the death on each victim's family."" As for the
cumulative impact of the evidence, the court stated that the impact evidence was
admissible to show the magnitude of the crime, and that the large number of victims
comports with the severity of the act.'m Thus, the court found "that the jury based
its decision on a reasoned, moral judgement."3
XV. Conclusion
On August 14, 1997, Judge Matsch sentenced Timothy James McVeigh to the
death penalty, over two months after the jury returned a finding of guilty for all
counts?' s After the court of appeals opinion was issued, a petition or a writ of
certiorari was filed, on January, 4, 1999. As of this writing, no state charges have
been filed.?
321. See id. at 1218.
322. See id
323. See id.
324. See id. at 1219.
325. Id at 1221.
326. See id
327. Id at 1222.
328. See Judgment and Order, Aug. 14, 1997, McVeigh (No. 4877-96-CR-6814).
329. However, State Rep. Charles Key circulated a petition that called for a grand jury to be
convened to address the public offenses related to the bombing of the Murrah Building. See In re Grand
Jury, 935 P.2d 1189 (Ckla. Ct App. 1996). As a result, a grand jury was impaneled on June 30, 1997.
The grand jury issud its final report on December 30, 1998. See In re Oklahoma County Grand Jury
Final Report, No. CJ-95-7278 (District Ct. Okla. County Dec. 30, 1998). The report was read into open
court by Oklahoma Coainty District Judge William R. Burkett, who also read into the record a prepared
statement of his own comments. The grand jury heard from 117 witnesses and received 1,109 exhibits.
The jury was in session 133 working days. The jury recommended that the indictments be returned but
stated the bombing "was an act that could have been carried out by one individual. We cannot
affirmatively state that absolutely no one else was involved in the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building." Id, slip op. at 20-21.
The grand jury had no power to subpoena witnesses who live outside of Oklahoma and could thus
not compel the attendance of witnesses from Michigan, Kansas, and Arizona. Additionally, the jury
initially was prevented from receiving assistance from federal agents. See United States v. McVeigh, 157
F.3d 809 (10th Cir. 19)8). The likelihood that it was unable to view the copious amounts of evidence
admitted at the federal trial of McVeigh is evidenced by the fact that it only received 1109 exhibits. The
ban was not lifted until two months before the final report was issued. Therefore, one must conclude that
the final report of the Oklahoma County grand jury is based on incomplete and inadequate information,
a fact recognized in th final report by the careful language stating that the jury could not exclude the
possibility of John Doe I or a broader conspiracy. Conversely, the federal grand jury found the existence
of a broader conspirac' when it issued its indictments of McVeigh and Nichols.
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On August 27, 1997, 1 withdrew as lead counsel for McVeigh, ending a very long
two-and-a-half years. I asked the court of appeals to appoint Rob Nigh to handle
the appeal, and it did so.
We made a maximum effort in defending McVeigh because our sense of profes-
sional obligation and temperament permitted nothing less. We never slackened and
we never gave up. Yet our efforts failed in their ultimate purpose because the goal
was unachievable. Once media coverage started in a particular direction, it became
a journalistic juggernaut, hard to turn, harder to reverse. The media printed false
statements and were negligent in some of the coverage. Prominence, with a few
exceptions, was given to reporting which supported the FBI's view. The bombing
in Oklahoma City makes it clear how tempting it is for journalists covering a highly
visible investigation to adopt the investigator's theories as their own.
There is much to be learned from United States v. McVeigh. Issues were
presented that have never before been confronted by the decision makers in our
legal system, and that hopefully never will be again. Perhaps the greatest lesson to
learn is that throughout our lives, we will be called to serve. We may not
understand how we came to be there, assisting in the manner that we are. But
hopefully we can say when we leave that we did the very best we could. In her
wonderful novel To Kill A Mockingbird, Harper Lee's fictional lawyer, Atticus
Finch, tells his daughter, Scout, "Simply by the nature of the work, every lawyer
gets at least one case in his lifetime that affects him personally. This one is
mine."' "3 Well, this one was one of mine.
330. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 73 (1960).
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